During their conversation, the central theme quickly became clear. In mission-critical environments, sustainability means lifetime extension, not constant redesign. It involves building electronic architectures that can be maintained, repaired, and supported without forcing costly, high-risk redesigns.
Aerospace and defence platforms are built for upwards of 40 years of continuous use. Unfortunately, the semiconductors at the heart of these systems can become unavailable within the first decade. This challenge shapes modern obsolescence management. It also explains why critical systems engineers increasingly plan for durability, maintenance, and redesign risks at the start rather than treating end-of-life notices as unexpected and unwelcome surprises.
In general, fast-moving consumer electronics markets now drive semiconductor roadmaps, volumes, and schedules. This leaves lower-volume, long-life programmes vulnerable unless design teams and suppliers collaborate early on sourcing strategies, inventory buffers, last-time buys, and, crucially, licensed, like-for-like manufacturing that preserves certification.
Luke said: “Electrification of everything, from cars to homes, drives volumes that far surpass aerospace and defence—hundreds of millions, probably billions of devices—so the landscape has changed.”
Why obsolescence affects mission-critical programmes
For decades, aerospace and defence have driven advances in semiconductor technology. Today, the focus has shifted to consumers. Fitzpatrick explained that the aerospace sector’s influence over component lifecycles has decreased because consumer and automotive volumes dwarf mission-critical demand. The outcome is predictable: parts reach End-of-Life (EOL) well before aircraft and other critical infrastructure complete their planned service life.
Designers feel this most acutely when the development and certification timeline for a programme already consumes a large portion of a component’s market life. By the time a flight system is market-ready, its silicon may already be considered ‘old’.
Some subsystems, such as in-flight entertainment, required periodic strategic refreshes as user expectations change. Others, say a refuelling panel designed in the 1990s, provides no benefit from a performance upgrade and therefore remains unchanged for as long as the host platform is in use. This underscores the difference between being forced into a redesign and planning a redesign that aligns with the programme’s objectives.
Forced redesigns incur high costs and pose risks to schedules. One aerospace case cited in the discussion demonstrated how budgets and timescales can expand well beyond initial estimates when certification, safety cases, and software ripple effects are tallied. This is more important than ever, as software now drives many redesign efforts.
Luke said: “You’re probably looking at 70 per cent software and 30 per cent hardware.”
Design-stage obsolescence management: modularity, funding, and intelligence
Best practices begin at the concept phase. In Rochester’s experience, obsolescence management should be planned at the programme level from the beginning, rather than left to individual engineers under pressure to deliver a new design. Modularity involves partitioning systems so at-risk components can be replaced without upending certified assemblies, while contingency planning includes earmarking funds for last-time buys, redesigns, or licensed replacement routes.
Teams also need better signals than static ‘years to end-of-life’ entries on component portals. Those values mirror supplier roadmaps but can lag real drivers such as foundry shifts, package supply, or strategic exits from legacy nodes. Rochester positions its value here as market intelligence drawn from ongoing conversations with original component manufacturers, foundries, lead-frame suppliers, and its own manufacturing roadmap. This intelligence helps customers prioritise what to protect in the bill of materials.
For example, demand for advanced packaging and high-bandwidth memory can squeeze legacy DRAM lines, with programme risk emerging not at the processor, but in seemingly secondary parts. Fitzpatrick advised that ‘critical’ is anything that would create a hardware or software headache if it vanished tomorrow, especially if it is single-sourced.
On the practical side, Rochester often begins by reviewing a customer’s critical parts list under NDA and assessing risks based on three factors: active authorised stock, licensed manufacturing capability, and forward knowledge of potential obsolescence triggers. The goal is to transform last-time buys from guesswork constrained by funding into phased, lower-risk plans that bridge to new-date-code supply when possible.
Stephen said, “Give us your critical parts list. Let’s see what we hit. We’ve had huge hit rates.”
Licensed manufacturing: die, package, test, and risk elimination
Rochester’s differentiation in this narrative is licensed, like-for-like manufacturing. The company can start from bare die, manage packaging and lead frames, and obtain test IP under licence so that replacement parts are electrically and functionally equivalent to the original. This creates drop-in components that fit into existing boards without triggering redesign or requalification.
Stephen said, “Our intention is to put a product back into that board with a Rochester brand on it that functions exactly the same as the original part.”
Luke explained why the licence matters to certification teams under time pressure: “Because Rochester is performing under licence, the manufacturer’s part number is the same.”
Copy-equivalent parts that are merely fit, form, and function compatible can still undermine timing, introduce subtle interactions, or invalidate design artefacts.
Stephen warned that small variations in track lengths, capacitance, or resistance at the silicon level can destabilise timing chains in safety-critical systems in intermittent, potentially catastrophic ways: “All you need is track lengths, track widths, capacitance, resistance to change within that piece of silicon and it can have a huge knock-on effect on timing on a circuit.”
The payback for licensed, like-for-like parts is avoiding needless flight trials or full requalification. The interview mentioned a flight-control customer that swapped in Rochester-made devices which are manufactured under licence without re-running flight testing, saving years and significant costs while keeping aircraft in service.
Sector snapshots: aerospace backlog, defence, drones, and robotics
Aerospace demand is growing due to rising air travel in developing economies and a lack of near-term propulsion revolutions to reset platforms. That growth translates into extensive order backlogs lasting a decade or more. For operators and tier suppliers, the practical effect is the pressure to extend existing certified systems rather than redesign them, even as obsolescence accelerates. Rochester reports regular requests from aviation customers for extended safety stock or manufacturing plans to match those backlogs.
Defence is different. Volumes are influenced by geopolitics, with governments increasing spending on new technology and infrastructure while extending existing platforms. Here too, maintaining current certified electronics often outweighs the risks of redesign, especially when software content is high and recertification takes a long time.
Uncrewed systems add complexity to the situation. Fitzpatrick described surveillance-class drones that, due to their size and purpose, require civil-aviation-grade certifications, while recreational models do not. This certification requirement directly affects how much durability and obsolescence planning are needed. In any case, as drones expand and diversify, parts of the category begin to resemble traditional aerospace in their need for supported lifetimes.
Robotics raises similar concerns. In factories, robots are long-lived capital assets, and any system operating near people requires stricter safety protocols. Morris suggested that future regulation will likely raise the standards for proximity-safe robots, increasing the importance of stable hardware and long-term semiconductor support. Elevators and escalators were cited as analogies: highly regulated machines carrying people, with electronics that must operate reliably.
Practical checklists: new designs and legacy support
Durability is the main focus in this discussion, supported by design features for modularity, maintainability, and repairability, along with collaborative supply-chain intelligence. The interview summarized this into two checklists: one for new, or clean-sheet programmes, and one for legacy products.
Checklist: clean-sheet programmes
For new designs, Fitzpatrick and Morris encouraged teams to incorporate obsolescence thinking at the programme level. Contracting language with end customers should recognise lifetime extension realities. Architectures should isolate at-risk devices behind module boundaries so parts can be replaced without causing changes across safety-critical assemblies.
Programme budgets should allocate funds in advance for Last-Time-Buys (LTBs) or licensed replacements. Above all, engage suppliers early to identify which components are true single-point risks and where authorised stock or licensed manufacturing can hedge them.
Checklist: legacy products
For legacy support, the advice was pragmatic. Share the critical parts list under NDA. Map each item against current authorised inventory, licensed manufacturing options, and known risk signals. If last-time buys have already been executed, verify how long they will remain in service. Use supplier intelligence to right-size future purchases or to bridge into new-date-code supply via licensed manufacturing, rather than defaulting to panic buys or rushed redesigns.
Fitzpatrick closed with a reminder that engineering teams are not alone in this. Partners exist specifically to de-risk obsolescence and extend service life.
Luke said: “They don’t have to take the next step, the obsolescence step, alone.”
Next steps
First, prioritise durability as the lead requirement for mission-critical electronics and write it into programme objectives.
Second, appoint a project-level owner for obsolescence who can coordinate design, procurement, and certification at the start.
Third, identify critical devices as anything that would cause a hardware or software headache if it disappeared tomorrow, especially single-source parts.
Fourth, under NDA, share the critical parts list with authorised partners who can combine market intelligence, active factory stock, and licensed manufacturing options.
Fifth, plan funding triggers for last-time buys or licensed like-for-like replacements to prevent forced redesigns that push programmes off schedule.
